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Abstract
The legislative gaps in international eCommerce and specifically in the gambling
industry mean that many consumers face the market condition of caveat emptor (let the
buyer beware). In terms of consumer psychology, caveat emptor increases consumer
perceptions of risk and slows the diffusion of Internet gambling. This paper discusses
the specific risks associated with Internet gambling and presents an industry structure
designed to off-set consumer perceptions of perceived risk through industry self
regulation and alternative dispute management techniques.
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The potential risks consumers face when making financial transactions on the
Internet are widespread. Lansing and Hubbard (2003) note that the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission received over 10,700 complaints in 1999, and that even the most reputable
websites (e.g. eBay, Sotheby's, Amazon) have been rocked by scandals that have affected
consumers. More recently, a report in Marketing Matters claims the Internet Crime
Complaint Centre received 207,449 complaints in 2004 (a 66.6% increase over 2003) and
that the total monetary loss from fraud cases was $68.14 million (American Marketing
Association, 2005). The National Consumers League, 2006) Internet fraud website
reports the number of complaints they received increased from 10,794 in 2004 to 12,315
in 2005, with lotteries/lottery clubs ranked fifth on the top scam category.
The organic structure of the Internet gambling industry makes it difficult to estimate
levels of complaint in the industry. Data specific to complaints with Internet gambling
come from the self proclaimed "independent standards authority for the online gaming
industry called E-Commerce and Online Gaming Regulation and Assurances (e-cogra)
which reports receiving a total of 439 complaints for 2005 and of those only 10%
of complaints turned out to be valid complaints demanding redress. In addition, the
Interactive Gaming Council, an industry body of Internet gambling providers which are
licensed to operate from a jurisdiction (or defined political boundary), reports receiving
approximately 1000 complaints since 2001 (Smith and Catania 2005).
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Although the Internet gambling industry produces data suggesting strong growth
from inception to predicted turnover of almost $12billion in 2005 (e.g., Christiansen
Capital Advisors, 2006), the industry's market penetration remains low and its diffusion
slow relative to other forms of gambling. For example, in the U. S. there are an estimated
six million Internet gamblers (Christiansen Capital Advisors, LLC & River City 2005)
out of a resident U.S. population aged over eighteen years of over 220 million people
(or 2.7% market penetration). By comparison, the American Gaming Association (2005)
cites data from Harrah's Casinos that estimate 54.1 million people over 18 years of age
left their home to visit a casino in 2004 (25% market penetration). The American Gaming
Association also refers to Luntz Research Companies data that 53% of the U.S. adult
population played lotteries in 2004. From one of the few studies that examine gambling
from inception and over time, it can be seen the diffusion of all lottery products in
Florida was far more rapid than the growth experienced by Internet gambling (Mizerski,
Miller, Mizerski and Lam, 2004). In Australia Roy Morgan Research (2004) indicates
Internet gambling has been growing at approximately .1% to .2% per annum, and market
penetration is approximately I% of people aged 18+ years. This diffusion rate compares
poorly with other new forms of gambling introduced since the 1990s and by contrast,
an estimated 80+% of Australians report gambling each year. The Internet's slow rate
of diffusion and low market penetration occur regardless of the Internet's competitive
advantages whereby consumers can choose from a vast number of gambling formats
from the comfort of their home and (potentially) better odds due to few brick and mortar
overheads and potential tax and compliance advantages.
It has been suggested that U. S. citizens comprise as much as 80% of global Internet
gambling, but that the activity is 100% illegal in the U.S. (Payne, 2005). However, these
data and the legal status of Internet gambling are contested by some members of the
interactive gambling industry, especially those operating with a license from a politically
recognised nation. Still, heightened levels of consumer risk resulting from the absence
of regulation are manifest through concerns for security, respect for privacy, customer
service, timely delivery, full and fair disclosure and responsiveness to complaints (e.g.,
Coventry, 2000). Cabot (2001) adds that the Internet gambling operators' integrity,
possible intentions to defraud and jurisdictional and other legal issues are factors that may
adversely influence consumer perceptions of Internet gambling. According to the CEO of
London based Sports bet, regulation of the Internet gambling industry "would eliminate
some of the less-than-reputable sites" (Tedesco, 2005).
This paper suggests that the absence of effective consumer laws governing Internet
commerce (c.f. Johnson and Post, 1996; Donahey, 2003) heightens perceptions of risk
to levels so high as to render the risks unacceptable to many consumers. The absence of
high levels of regulation normally associated with gambling and the intangible nature
of Internet gambling may exacerbate consumer perceptions of risk with the Internet
and make consumers reluctant to trial Internet gambling. As perceived risk is a major
behavioural determinant for consumers (Cox and Rich, 1964) and there is an inverse
relationship between product trial and perceived risk (Dash, Schiffman and Berenson,
1976), the absence of an effective legal framework protecting consumers increases the
risks faced by consumers and seems a likely inhibitor for consumer transactions over the
Internet. Indeed, heightened levels of perceived risk have been found to be an inhibitor of
consumer transactions over the Internet (Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky, 1999; Pavlou, 2001;
Featherman and Pavlou, 2003).
Internet gambling occurs under conditions of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). It
is the seller's problem how to alleviate the risks perceived in his product (Roselius, 1971).
Internet gambling will only fulfil its market potential when credible solutions can be found
to the consumer issues of: to whom does one turn when something goes wrong, what laws
apply and is it practical to seek redress? This paper presents an integrated model of industry
self regulation that incorporates constructs of trust and service recovery, and specialised
alternative dispute resolution procedures to neutralise actual and perceived consumer risk.
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Moderating Consumer Perceptions of Perceived Risk with Internet Gambling
The absence of legal frameworks that specifically permit and regulate Internet
gambling in markets such as the U.S. and Australia represents a considerable structural
difference compared to terrestrial gambling. In terrestrial gambling the rights of
consumers are well defined and the operating conditions of casinos and other gambling
providers highly regulated and readily controllable within physical structures. Firms
that supply gambling facilities over the Internet are at a competitive disadvantage as
consumers have no obvious assurances about the validity of
the honesty of the games played and their rights if there
Internet gambling occurs under islicenses,
a disagreement. As reflected in Figure 1, this paper suggests
conditions of caveat emptor. that intentions to gamble on the Internet will improve with a
better understanding of consumer risks and the moderating
variables of self regulation and alternative dispute resolution.
Risk
The literature suggests that there are several different types of risk associated
with consumer behaviour. Cunningham (1967) considered risk had six dimensions: (1)
performance, (2) financial, (3) opportunity/time, (4) safety, (5) social, (6) psychological
loss, but that all risk ultimately stemmed from performance risk. Featherman and Pavlou
(2003) later suggest the addition of (7) Privacy risk be added to the general typology of
risk relevant to an online environment. Cunningham's proposition that all risk stemmed
from performance risk was empirically tested in an online environment using structural
equation modelling by Featherman and Pavlou (2003) and was strongly supported as
the antecedent to other forms of risk. It is apparent that the absence of effective legal
protocols and recognised avenues by which consumers can take recourse heightens the
level of environmental (privacy and financial) and performance (including satisfaction
with the product) risk faced by consumers. There is no clear theoretical justification that
the Internet can meaningfully influence consumer perceptions of risk associated with
opportunity/time, safety, social, or psychological dimensions.
For the purposes of this paper, financial risk represents the opportunity of monetary
losses. This is consistent with McCorkle's ( 1990) definition of financial risk as concern
over any financial loss that might be incurred because of the product purchase. Privacy
has previously been defined as the ability of the individual to control the terms under
which personal information is acquired and used (Westin 1967, cited by Culnan and
Armstrong 1999). To be more relevant for research into the Internet, this definition is
refined to include the theft of private information or illegal disclosure. The third dimension
of risk is performance risk. Jacoby and Kaplan (1972) suggest that concern over whether
the product will perform as expected is perceived as performance risk. This paper
broadly applies transaction satisfaction (often associated with services) as the measure
of performance risk. This is appropriate as the Internet industry for which the conceptual
model is constructed is a pure service industry (e.g., Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky 1999).
Industry Self Regulation
The need to create an environment of trust, predictability and certainty that features
good arbitration and jurisdiction has been recognised as necessary fore-commerce to
flourish (Endeshaw, 1999). Electronic commerce will not realise its full potential unless
consumers can be sure that they can resolve their grievances in an expeditious and cost
effective manner (Donahey, 2003). This paper suggests a framework of industry self
regulation (consisting of accredited service recovery and trust tags) and alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) as the means to neutralise perceived consumer risk associated
with the Internet as a marketing channel and thereby reduce sizeable barriers to purchase.
Industry accreditation is proposed as the marque for minimum standards for firms that
operate over the Internet, conceptually replacing a permit or license to trade that may be
issued by government in more traditional forms of commerce.
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Figure 1 shows trust as one of the two basic components of industry self regulation.
A number of studies have confirmed that low levels of trust and satisfaction exist between
buyers and sellers on the Internet (e.g. Yoon, 2002; Culnan and
Armstrong, 1999). Reichheld and Schefter (2000; 107) go so far
Electronic commerce will
as to claim that "price does not rule the web, trust does". Keen
not realise its full potential
(1999) identified a lack of trust as a major reason why consumers
unless consumers can be sure
do not purchase over the Internet. Hoffman, Novak and Peralta
(1999) suggest that a lack of trust is a barrier to consumer
that they can resolve their
transactions over the Internet and that seller opportunism and
grievances in an expeditious
concerns about the misuse of Internet infrastructure are causes of
and cost effective manner.
low consumer trust In general, the higher the perception of risk,
the higher the trust needed to facilitate a transaction (Jarvenpaa
and Tractinsky, 1999; Koller, 1988).

Figure 1: Consumer Risk, Self Regulation and Alternative Dispute Resolution
This paper advocates the development of a trust tag as a component for industry
self regulation. In this instance, a trust tag should be a binding agreement by industry
members to maintain a minimum standard of service recovery processes, and a formal
agreement to utilise specialist alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes should
attempts at service recovery be deficient. While a trust tag may indicate minimum
operating standards to consumers, the threat of withdrawal of a trust tag by an industry
organisation becomes part of the enforcement tool-kit. The Cyberspace business
community has strong self interests in the creation and enforcement of rules for Internet
trade (Johnson and Post, 1996). In practice, and areas worthy of further research,
strategies are required to deal with "rogue" sites displaying the trust tag when they are not
members and the development of efficient marketing campaigns
to convey the benefits of the trust tag to consumers.
A lack of trust is a barrier to
The second component of industry self regulation is service
consumer transactions over the
recovery. The short term commercial rationale of service recovery
Internet.
and defensive marketing schemes can be justified to members as
the cost of generating new customers generally exceeds the cost
of retaining existing customers (Fornell and Wernerfelt, 1987;
Fornell and Westbrook, 1984; Brown, 2000) by as much as five times (Hart, Heskett and
Sasser 1990; Keaveney, 1995). A customer's long term value to the firm is usually higher
than the value of the purchase complained about (Fornell and Westbrook, 1984) and
customer exit implies a direct loss of revenue (e.g. Fornell and Wernerfelt, 1987). In the
general e-commerce environment, Mainspring and Bain & Company (2000, cited in Long
and McMellon, 2004) estimate that the average consumer must shop four times at an
online store before profits are realised from that customer. There is no publicly available
information on the profitability of customers and the need for customer repeat purchase
associated with Internet gambling.
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A more strategic view of service recovery is espoused for this model. Minimum
levels of service recovery are required to build consumer trust and reduce their
perceptions of risk, thereby reducing barriers to product trial. Documented and minimum
service recovery standards should be required for accreditation to the self-regulating
industry body to reinforce the perception that Internet gambling firms and the industry are
striving to assist consumers.
The cornerstone of service recovery is the employment of resources designed to
increase consumer voice. Customers give voice in the expectation of service recovery
and to seek redress (Dasu and Rao, 1999). When viewed positively, customer complaints
can give an organisation a chance to turn a dissatisfied consumer into a satisfied and
loyal customer (Fornell and Wernerfelt, 1987) with even stronger brand loyalty than
customers who did not complain (e.g. Hart et al., 1990; Kelley
The cornerstone of service et al., 1993). It has also been shown that effective service
recovery can enhance consumer perceptions of satisfaction,
recovery is the employment of purchase intent and positive word of mouth (Maxham, 2001).
resources designed to increase Other research has identified that satisfaction varies with
consumer VOlCe. the level of service recovery effort and likely increases with
excellent service recovery practices (McCollough, Hoffman and
Berry, 1996; Kelley and Davis, 1994). For online businesses,
additional benefits of accepting feedback can include: more knowledge of consumer (i.e.,
preferences and past behaviour), customer education, the opportunity to prevent further
service errors, and the bases for mass customisation of products (Meuter et al., 2000).

Alternative Dispute Resolution
The active participation of Internet gambling firms in a specialised ADR scheme
would be a condition of membership in the peak industry organisation. The basic tenet
of a successful ADR scheme is that it should be fair and equitable for all parties. These
general principles include: the impartiality of any decision-makers; accessibility of the
systems and procedures; the need to ensure that the mechanisms are at low or no cost to
the consumer relative to the amount in dispute; transparency, including the importance of
providing consumers with clear and conspicuous. information about the procedures and
commitments involved sufficient to enable informed choice and decision-making; the
timeliness of redress (Coventry, 2000).
Just as technology has facilitated Internet gambling, there is a growing body of
research relating to Internet based ADR. The benefits of utilizing the Internet for dispute
resolutions, particularly for services vended online are considered to be: efficiency,
convenience, accessibility and cost-effectiveness (Gordon, 2001). Online methods of
ADR could offer consumers a dispute resolution mechanism to install confidence in the
transaction of online commerce (Donahey, 2003). Further, it is argued that ADR online
can be particularly useful in large multiparty disputes from different countries, and that
because all cyberspace communicants are considered equal, the Internet reduces barriers
and imbalances between large and small disputants (Gordon, 2001).
The two dominant forms of ADR applicable for the model
presented in this paper are mediation and arbitration. Mediation
Just as technology has facilitated may be compared with arbitration whereby a third party holds
Internet gambling, there is a a hearing at which time, disputants state their positions on the
growing body of research relating issues, call their witnesses and offer supporting evidence for their
to Internet based ADR. respective positions (Ross and Conlon, 2000). All mediation
practices are organised around the idea that the mediator's job
is to help the parties tell their story - to help the parties talk
(Katsh Rifkin and Gaitenby, 2000). In their study into online dispute resolutions for eBay
transactions, Katsh et al. (2000) preferred mediation to arbitration, and a single mediator
to a group of mediators as it would be easier to obtain the co-operation of the second
party. By contrast, Arbitration is an adjudicatory ADR process that requires the disputing
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parties to submit their cases to an independent third party (an arbitrator) for a decision
(Lansing and Hubbard, 2002). An arbitrator's decision is usually binding; however rules
that require legal enforcement are problematic over the Internet.

Conclusions
Already some of the components suggested in this paper are starting to be developed.
For example, there is some strengthening of industry bodies that may facilitate moves
to self regulation over time. An online search of "ADR" reveals a number of different
organisations are offering online-ADR services and a number of international bodies
are debating the effectiveness of ADR. What is required to accelerate the path to lower
levels of consumer risk are industry specific frameworks for the integrated development,
management and monitoring of each of the components suggested in this model at
an industry level. Each organization within an industry (e.g. online gambling) must
also make it a formal and priority objective to shift consumer attitudes towards online
commerce.
In the proposed model of industry self regulation, the substantive rules that
constitute the core of the social system or the operational intentions of the peak industry
organisation should be developed collectively by firms with the express purpose of
defining acceptable conduct towards consumers and paths to enforce and reward desirable
behavior. It suggests minimum standards will be required for the accreditation of Trust
(tags) and Service Recovery processes on individual forms. Remedial rules should be
prescribed by the industry group to specify the magnitude and nature of any sanction
required should the substantial rules be breached. Both remedial and substantive rules
are administered by a regulator or steward charged with independence and operating
from within the industry body. The regulator or steward would be empowered to
use a combination of formal (e.g., fines, withdrawal of trust marks, cancellation of
membership) and informal (e.g., social instruction, education) processes to administer
the substantive and remedial rules. The opt-in nature of industry organisations and
the contribution firms can make in the creation of remedial and substantive rules (rule
agreement) suggest member firms will not be opportunistic in their compliance to codes
of conduct and treatment of customers. This implies that the peak body's policing of
industry policies will predominantly rely on informal processes (such as communication
and education). Informal processes are also consistent with the dependency that peak
industry bodies ultimately have to their constituents. However, there will be the need to
have and be seen to have "lines in the sand" across which formal rules will be stringently
administered in order to build consumer confidence (Donahey, 2003). Under the proposed
model, the ultimate sanctions may include the withdrawal of membership accreditation
and Jaw suits (including breach of contract in non-compliance of the conditions of the
ADR processes). Coventry (2000) suggests that self-regulatory codes of conduct and
technologies can be used to gain consumer confidence in electronic commerce.
The model outlined in this paper was guided, and to some extent limited, by the
existing literature. There is the need for a new paradigm for Internet gambling, and this
may in turn be useful for other industries. The next step in this research is data collection
from e-consumers and those yet to consume through the Internet to better understand
consumer motivations. Thereafter it will be possible to refine the suggested model to
moderate consumer perceptions of risk specific for Internet gambling. Further research
into self regulation and the operation of online alternative dispute resolution methods is
also warranted.
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